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THE CONUNDRUM OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
Cally Jordan∗
I. INTRODUCTION

I

t has become a truism that the pressures of the capital
markets will improve the governance of corporations;
equally, that improvements in corporate governance will promote development of the capital markets. However, the relationship of the capital markets to the governance of corporations is neither simple nor linear; rather it is more in the nature
of a complex feedback loop, a dynamic process responsive to
many factors.
The efforts to identify the factors which promote capital market development and improvements in corporate governance
have spawned a huge body of literature. Central to the discourse has been the role of legal systems and legal rules. The
popularity and proliferation of international standards, among
other factors, have resulted in massive transfers of legal information, but often the relative ineffectiveness of transplanted
legal rules has proved a conundrum.
This article builds on previous literature looking at how to
predict the effectiveness of transplanted legal concepts and the
implications for corporate governance initiatives and capital
market development. The recent economics literature has ignored the complexity and dynamism of legal systems. More
tellingly, the “legal origins” literature has misunderstood the
fundamental nature of the benchmark U.S. legal system, the
genius of which, according to some commentators, resides in its
combination of elements of both the common law and the civil
law traditions.
∗ Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida, Senior Counsel, The
World Bank, B.A. (Carleton); M.A. (Toronto); LL.B., B.C.L. (McGill); D.E.A.
(Paris I (Panthéon-Sorbonne)). This paper is based on a presentation made at
the Brooklyn Law School and the New York Stock Exchange Roundtable, New
York City, October 4, 2002. The views expressed are those of the author and
do not represent those of The World Bank Group or its Board of Directors.
With thanks to Alex Yu for his able assistance. You may contact the author at
jordanc@law.ufl.edu/ or cjjh@cox.net.
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So, more discernment is needed in introducing new legal concepts, particularly in what are now sometimes referred to as
“frontier economies,” as well as greater attention being paid to
the essential process of “indigenization.” Even the form a legal
rule takes can be as important as its substance. Indiscriminate
mixing and matching of legal rules, such as that occurring in
the aftermath of mass privatizations that marked the 1990s,
can easily go awry. The result may be dysfunctional or unbalanced systems with unpredictable, and certainly unintended,
consequences. At worst, perversities may occur, for example,
where a deliberately ineffective rule is introduced domestically,
seemingly in furtherance of the implementation of internationally recognized standards.
Adding to the complexity of the operation of formal legal rules
is another complex layer, “legal sensibilities,” an often ignored
but essential element to the effectiveness of any legal rule. Fiduciary duties, for example, one of the cornerstones of AngloAmerican corporate governance, are imbued with the legal sensibilities of a particular time and place and may travel badly, if
at all, to other climes.
These observations may have some predictive value in gauging the potential effectiveness of any particular initiative.
“Voluntary” codes and procedural remedies drawn from AngloAmerican law, for example, may not be the most effective
means of channeling market forces to the improvement of the
governance of corporations in continental European-style legal
systems.
Governance mechanisms introduced in multiple
guises along a continuum of private and public rule may amplify the prospects of effectiveness.
Finally, new models for markets and capital markets regulation are emerging in Europe, models that may be more compatible with the legal systems of much of the nonCommonwealth world.
II. THE DEBATE
The events of the last fifteen years rival the South Sea Bubble and tulip mania in focusing popular attention on capital
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markets and corporations.1 There have been spectacular market surges and market failures accompanied by a panoply of
regulatory and private sector responses. The intensity of the
activity and its consequences have raised fundamental questions as to how capital markets, and financial systems generally, grow and develop and the role of corporate actors.
The efforts to identify the factors which promote capital market development and improvements in corporate governance
have spawned a huge body of literature. Central to the discourse has been the role of legal systems and legal rules. Are
some legal systems better than others in fostering financial sector development?2 Can formal legal rules from such systems be
transplanted to other systems to promote better corporate governance and the development of capital markets?3 Will there be
inevitable convergence of the rules of “weaker” legal systems to
those of “stronger” legal systems?4 Can international standards
1. The recent 2004 release THE CORPORATION, a film by Mark Achbar,
Jennifer Abbott & Joel Bakan, is an indication of the degree to which the debate has entered popular culture.
2. See Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113
(1998); Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance,
58 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2000); Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 J. FIN. 1147 (2001). More recently, see LA PORTA ET AL.,
WHAT WORKS IN SECURITIES LAWS? (Tuck School of Bus., Working Paper No.
03-22, July 16, 2003), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=425880 (last
visited May 20, 2005). The legal origins literature referred to in this article is
primarily based on the La Porta studies:
Because legal origins are highly correlated with the content of the
law, and because legal families originated before financial markets
had developed, it is unlikely that laws were written primarily in response to market pressures. Rather the legal families appear to
shape the legal rules, which in turn influence financial markets…legal rules do matter.
La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, at 3. For a
comprehensive discussion of the literature, see Katharina Pistor et al., The
Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L
ECON. L. 791 (2002).
3. See KATHARINA PISTOR, PATTERNS OF LEGAL CHANGE: SHAREHOLDER AND
CREDITOR RIGHTS IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Working Paper No. 49, May 2002), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=214654 (last visited May
20, 2005).
4. For discussions of the convergence theory, see William W. Bratton &
Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate Governance and the Theory of
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be formulated to provide guidance to developing and transition
economies, and if so, based on what?5 And, the conundrum of
corporate governance, why are “good” legal rules so often ineffective?
There are still more questions than answers:

the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 212 (1999). Cf. JOHN C. COFFEE, COMPETITION AMONG SECURITIES MARKETS:
A PATH DEPENDENT PERSPECTIVE 17 (Colum. Law School, Ctr. for Law and
Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 192, Apr. 2002), available at
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/law-economicstudies/papers/wp192.pdf
(last
visited May 20, 2005); John C. Coffee, The Future as History: The Prospects for
Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 N.W. U.
L. REV. 641 (1999). In addition, Jeffrey N. Gordon and Mark J. Roe have recently published a collection of papers on the convergence debate in
CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2004).
5. Both the International Organization of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) have been active in formulating influential standards in the area of
capital markets and corporate governance. See, e.g., IOSCO, Objectives and
Principles of Securities Regulation, May 2003, available at http://www.
iosco.org/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf (last visited May 20, 2005) (revising
the 1998 Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation and used extensively by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in their program of country Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs),
which have been conducted in dozens of countries to date); IOSCO, International Disclosure Standards for Cross-Border Offerings and Initial Listings by
Foreign Issuers, Sept. 1998, available at http://www.iosco.org/pubdocs/
pdf/IOSCOPD81.pdf (last visited May 20, 2005) (which have formed the basis
of both U.S. S.E.C. and E.U. regulatory initiatives); OECD, Principles of Corporate Governance, 2004 revision, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd
/32/18/31557724.pdf (last visited May 20, 2005) (also used extensively in the
ROSC exercises).
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance were endorsed by the
OECD Ministers in 1999 and have since become an international
benchmark for policy makers, investors, corporations and other
stakeholders worldwide. They have advanced the corporate governance agenda and provided specific guidance for legislative and regulatory initiatives in both OECD and non-OECD countries. The Financial Stability Forum has designated the Principles as one of the
12 key standards for sound financial systems. The Principles also
provide the basis for an extensive programme of co-operation between
the OECD and non-OECD countries and underpin the corporate governance component of World Bank/IMF Reports on the Observance of
Standards and Codes (ROSC).
Id. at 3.
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In these globalizing times, corporate law’s leading question is
whether one or another national corporate governance system
(or component thereof) possesses relative competitive advantage . . . . Unfortunately, even as these descriptions become
thicker and more cogent, answers to the bottom-line questions
respecting competitive advantage have become more elusive
6
and convergence predictions have become more qualified.

Amid the thicket of discourse, speculation and experimentation
on corporate governance and capital market development, a few
guideposts peek through. Legal rules and legal families do matter.7 Political structures matter.8 History matters.9 Legal rules
can be more or less resistant to change.10 Forces of convergence
and divergence operate selectively on legal rules.11 Legal sys-

6. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 4, at 213
(“Related questions about competitive advantage and convergence to
best practice come up in domestic policy discussions in many countries. Concerns about local firms’ performance in international markets turns attention to alternative governance practices identified in
international comparisons: If competitive advantage lies elsewhere,
then domestic practice should be reformed to follow the international
leader. An extensive body of studies addresses these questions, identifying and evaluating national variations in management and financial practices, industrial organization, and corporate and securities
laws.”).
7. See Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 3 (2000).
8. RAGHURAM G. RAJAN & LUIGI ZINGALES, THE GREAT REVERSALS: THE
POLITICS OF FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE 20TH CENTURY 1–72 (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8178, 2001).
9. On the effect of the manner in which legal rules are introduced into a
system, e.g., by conquest, colonization, etc., see PISTOR, supra note 3; DANIEL
BERKOWITZ ET AL., ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, LEGALITY, AND THE TRANSPLANT
EFFECT (Davidson Inst., U. Mich., Working Paper No. 410, Sept. 2001), available at http://www.bus.umich.edu/KresgeLibrary/Collections/Workingpapers/
wdi/wp410.pdf (last visited May 20, 2005).
10. See generally LUCIAN ARYE BEBCHUK & MARK J. ROE, A THEORY OF PATH
DEPENDENCE IN CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE (Colum. Law School,
Ctr. for Law and Econ. Studies, Working Paper, No. 131, 1999), reprinted in
52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999); COFFEE, COMPETITION AMONG SECURITIES
MARKETS, supra note 4.
11. Cally Jordan, Experimentation in Capital Markets Regulation, Presentation at the International Organization of Securities Commission’s (IOSCO)
Seminar Training Program (Oct. 25, 2000).
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tems are systems and legal concepts are not indiscriminately
interchangeable components.12
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer
and Robert Vishny (LLSV), in an influential series of papers,
turned the spotlight on the relationship of legal rules and development of financial markets, the so-called “legal origins” literature. LLSV looked to the two main legal traditions in developed economies, the Anglo-American common law tradition and
the continental European “civil” or Romano-Germanic legal tradition, to conclude that the level of legal enforcement and the
origin of the rules correlated to the level of development of both
equity and debt markets.13 Measures of investor protection appeared superior in common law countries and translated into
more vibrant equity markets, they surmised from their findings.14
The implication, that common law systems are superior in
fostering sophisticated financial systems, was bound to sow controversy and did not go long unchallenged:15
First, it does not seem that legal or cultural impediments to
financial development are as serious as one might have concluded from recent literature. Somewhat facetiously, one does
not have to have the good fortune of being colonized by the
British to be able to have vibrant financial markets. However,
the main impediment we identify—the political structure
within the country—can be as difficult to overcome as more
16
structural impediments.

Both lines of thought are significant and not necessarily incompatible; each identifies a major determinant in the functioning
of financial markets, the legal rules or, more precisely, the legal
family or tradition to which they belong, and the political structures which create, support, or possibly, undermine them. Le-

12. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 4, at 215; Cally Jordan, Law Matters: Corporate Governance Legal Reforms in Asia and Their Implications for
the ECA Countries, Presentation at the World Bank (Sept. 27, 2000), available at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/corpgov/eastasia/core_pdfs/jordan_law
matters.ppt (last visited Sept. 20, 2004).
13. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 4.
14. Cf. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 4, at 228–30.
15. RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 8.
16. Id. at 7.
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gal rules or, more precisely again, statutory law, are the product of and dependent upon political action.
This debate, and the related one of convergence or divergence
in corporate governance systems, caught the eye of Katharina
Pistor, then a legal scholar at the Max Planck Institute in
Hamburg. Proponents of both a convergence theory and a divergence (or path dependency) theory “regard legal institutions
as important for promoting or hindering convergence, but differ
in their assessment of the propensity of a particular body of
law, such as corporate law, to achieve this goal.”17 Pistor’s conclusion: “a simple convergence story does not do justice to the
complexity of legal change.”18
Obviously intrigued by the complexity of legal change, Pistor
has gone on to look at “legal transplants” or the “transplant effect” in corporate law and the relative effectiveness of hybridization.19 How do legal concepts from one system fare when
transplanted to another? Her conclusion here is that the manner of transplantation of a legal concept is significant. The extent to which a “foreign” legal concept has been voluntarily introduced or embraced (as opposed to imposed, for political or
other reasons), is a predictor of effectiveness.20

17. See PISTOR, supra note 3, at 4
(“There is a lively debate in the corporate governance literature about
these alternative patterns of institutional development and in particular about the role of law for convergence or divergence of corporate governance systems. Proponents of the divergence, or path dependence, hypothesis argue that even if the corporate law was harmonized across countries, other legal rules (tax laws, codetermination
legislation etc.) and institution constraints (financial structure, existing ownership structure of firms), or simply political considerations
would stand in the way of convergence. The opposite view holds that
convergence is likely to take place, once the main regulatory obstacles
are removed. The economic forces towards success, they suggest, are
the same all over the world.”).
18. Id. at 46.
19. BERKOWITZ ET AL., supra note 9.
20. Id. There is a rich comparative literature on legal transplants and the
process of “reception” of non-indigenous legal concepts. See Pierre Legrand,
The Impossibility of Legal Transplants, 4 MAASTRICHT J. EURO. & COMP. L. 111
(1997).
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III. LEGAL TRANSPLANTS AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS:
“IDEAS HAVE WINGS”21
The promotion of “international standards” in both capital
markets and corporate governance has contributed to the proliferation of legal transplants. Dozens of international standards are being proposed (and, arguably, imposed) in financial
sectors around the world.22 The popularity of international
standards is often taken as an important indicator of the inevitable, and desirable, convergence of legal rules. The pressures
to conform to “international standards” can be attributed to a
number of factors: heavy promotion by the international financial institutions and development agencies such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the allure of “brand
name” legal solutions, and the influence of the LLSV literature
(which correlates common law systems to more highly developed financial markets). The attractive simplicity of some international standards may also explain their popularity;
pitched at a level of generality, they are readily accessible. A
casual perusal of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance23 has created many an instant expert.
However, international standards have not been picked out of
thin air. Their legal origins can be traced back to national sys21.
Ideas have wings. No legal system of significance has been able to
claim freedom from foreign inspiration. Roman law “borrowed” from
Greek law, Greek law from the laws of Crete and Egypt. The commercial usages of the flourishing city states of medieval Italy have
laid the foundations of modern mercantile law….There is, therefore,
nothing extraordinary about the adoption of “foreign” legal ideas, doctrines and even whole codes.
H. R. HAHLO & ELLISON KAHN, THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND ITS
BACKGROUND 484 (1973).
22. See Cally Jordan & Giovanni Majnoni, Financial Regulatory Harmonization and the Globalization of Finance, in GLOBALIZATION AND NATIONAL
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS, at 259, 274–75
(“[T]he proliferation of international standards and codes may exemplify the
lack of coordination that often precludes ‘first-best’ approaches to market
regulation. The establishment of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) was
specifically directed toward preventing such an outcome. As of February 2000
the FSF had identified 43 different codes and was considering 23 more for
inclusion.”).
23. See supra note 5.
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tems and, in capital markets and corporate governance, predominantly common law ones. In many economies, both developed and developing, adoption of a current international standard may also entail, explicitly or implicitly, adoption of foreign
legal concepts, or legal transplants, as well. Some transplants
may thrive; others may be so incompatible with the underlying
legal system as to never take root.
Gauging the effectiveness of these burgeoning international
standards, and the extent of convergence of national legal systems to them, however is no easy matter. “[T]he empirical evidence that links indicators of efficiency and stability to the legal
and regulatory framework has been based on indicators that
have only an indirect relationship with the degree of compliance
with international standards and codes.”24 The tenuous relationship between the adoption of international standards and
the effectiveness of the legal rules embedded in them deepens
the conundrum of corporate governance:
It may be more useful for countries with very small, illiquid
stock markets, to assess the conditions for establishing regional markets or for firms to access liquid foreign markets
rather than to assess national compliance with IOSCO standards that reflect the experience of regulators with markets of
25
average size and liquidity.

24. Jordan & Majnoni, supra note 22, at 275
(“A serious difficulty that dogs efforts of coordination of standards
and codes is the relative absence of empirical evidence demonstrating
a relationship between compliance with standards and financial stability. The initial evidence that linked indicators of legal and regulatory structure to the stability of banking and financial systems is
based on very aggregate indicators of structure. Only recently new
empirical work has started to test the nature of relationship of specific and more detailed specification of regulatory structures with financial development and stability.”).
25. Id. at 274 (“One of the weaknesses of the standards and codes approach
and of its operational legs (the FSAP and the Report on Observance of Standards and Codes programs) is to consider small, emerging economies as Lilliputian replicas of large, industrialized ones.”). As Majnoni commented in a
prior version of this paper, “In keeping with literary analogies, a more appropriate perspective might be that of Saint Exupery’s Petit Prince whose major
concern was the effect of trees and animals imported from Earth on his tiny
planet. He should have added financial institutions.” (manuscript on file with
the author).
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The conundrum is notable in the context of the transition
economies of Eastern and Central Europe: the co-existence of
high quality formal legislation, a product of “an external supply
of legal solutions”26 and low levels of effectiveness.27 Arguably,
effectiveness of recent reforms in developing and transition
economies has been inversely related to the degree of convergence to international standards. Why is this so?
IV. DYNAMISM AND COMPLEXITY
In the rush to international standards, a basic lesson from
comparative legal scholarship has been forgotten: legal systems
are both complex and dynamic.28 “Legal systems never are.
They always become.”29 Legal systems evolve over time by inventing, adapting, borrowing, and having change thrust upon
them. There are often redundancies, contradictions, and fossilized concepts or practices of no current significance embodied in
formal legal rules.30 In addition, any one legal concept, in any
one system, at any one time, exists and operates in a complex

26. See PISTOR, supra note 3, at 46.
27. Id. at 47
(“Weaknesses in the governance structure that are noted today are
often attributed to weaknesses in the law, which in turn leads to new
proposals for improving statutory law. The evidence of the quality of
the law on the books, however, suggests that this is at best a partial
story. The level of shareholder and creditor rights protection in transition economies today is higher than in many other countries. Other
factors, including the dynamic of the reform process and its impact on
the development of effective institutions to enforce the new law, need
to be analyzed more closely in order to understand the remarkable
difference in the governance of firms despite the trend towards convergence of the law on the books.”).
28. See Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the
World's Legal Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 5 (1997).
29. Id. at 14.
30. Arguably, cumulative voting, discussed infra, is one of the latter, having been displaced, as a practical matter, by statutory provisions permitting
direct representation on the board through the action of voting groups. See
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.04 (1979). For example, chapter 607.0804 of the
Florida Business Corporations Act (FBCA) reads, “The articles of incorporation may confer upon holders of any voting group the right to elect one or more
directors who shall serve for such term and have such voting powers as are
stated in the articles of incorporation.” FLA. STAT. ch. 607.0804 (1999).
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relationship with a myriad of other concepts.31 Put simply, “legal systems are the result of a layered complexity that stems
from the accidents of legal history and from legal transplants.”32
The complexity and dynamism of legal systems provide yet
another twist to the convergence/divergence debate. The forces
of convergence and divergence operate contemporaneously, but
selectively, on different kinds of legal rules. Relatively recent
statutory law in highly regulated and internationalized areas,
such as capital markets or banking regulation, may be very
sensitive to the forces of convergence. Older, more established
bodies of law, such as companies or corporate law which have
their origins in the nineteenth century, are more “path dependent,”33 more resistant to change and to the absorption of “foreign
elements.” The more basic the legal concept, the deeper its
roots and, arguably, the more impervious to external change, to
the forces of convergence, it becomes. Concepts of contract,
status, and property, for example, reach back hundreds and
thousands of years, and these concepts form the core of corporations law.34
31. For example, in the United States, state corporate law contains provisions with respect to the use of proxies in shareholder voting. For publicly
traded corporations, however, SEC regulations on proxy voting are much more
significant and extensive, rendering the state provisions more or less irrelevant. Corporate law itself draws together concepts of status, contract, property, agency, trust law, etc. Directors’ fiduciary duties, that cornerstone of
Anglo-American corporate governance, have no one single form of expression.
Fiduciary law concepts were developed by the early English courts of equity
and still find their fundamental expression through the courts. In addition,
various statutory formulations in U.S. corporate law (the familiar duty of care
and duty of loyalty provisions, see MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1999)), draw
on the very different concepts of negligence and trust law. The courts provide
further judicial glosses on existing statutory provisions, and in many states,
later enactments in reaction to judicial decisions, such as Smith v. van
Gorkom, significantly undercut the coterminous, but earlier, general statutory
duties. See generally Smith v. van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). See,
e.g., FLA. STAT. § 607.0831 (severely limiting directors’ liability for breaches of
duty.).
32. Mattei, supra note 28, at 13–14.
33. See BEBCHUK & ROE, supra note 10, at 154.
34. Roman law concepts have persisted over several thousand years, in
both the common and civil law traditions, the common law having undergone
a period of “early” reception of Roman law. “One of the effects of the Norman
conquest was to throw England into closer intellectual contact with the Continent….During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when the foundations of
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Further, legal concepts are part of complex systems and operate interdependently within their system. Capital market rules
interact with corporate law rules, which themselves are
grounded in notions of contract, status and property. Legal
rules that, in theory, should be effective at one level, could be
disabled by conflicts or incompatibility at another level. The
grief which followed mass privatizations of the 1990s can be
attributed to the indiscriminate mixing and matching of legal
rules, a process of transplantation which resulted in dysfunctional or imbalanced feedback loops. Corporate governance systems could not support capital markets and nascent or ailing
capital markets collapsed or declined. Without the disciplines
of the capital markets, corporate governance systems faltered.
This is not the whole story, of course, but it is a part of it.35
Adding to the complexity of the operation of “formal” legal
rules is another complex layer, sometimes referred to as “legal
sensibilities.”36 Legal sensibilities consist not only of “rules and
principles which can be cast in propositional form, but also of
higher order understandings, received techniques, constellations of values and shared ways of perceiving reality, which are
pervasive, often subtle, and themselves deeply layered in complex and important ways.”37 A keystone to modern corporate

the common law were being laid, Roman law…exercised great influence in
England….” HAHLO & KAHN, supra note 21, at 504. Roman “civil law” deals
primarily with concepts of status, property and contract, the backbone of the
great nineteenth-century civil codes.
35. The “tunneling” and looting of corporate assets in the 1990s that occurred in Slovakia and the Czech Republic in the wake of mass privatizations
have been the subject of a number of studies. See, e.g., John Nellis, Time to
Rethink Privatizations, in TRANSITION ECONOMIES FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT
16 (1999). With respect to the Czech Republic, John Nellis writes that “While
the most visible reasons for inadequate enterprise restructuring are weaknesses in capital and financial markets, the voucher privatization method
itself—with its emphasis on speed, postponement of consideration of many
aspects of the legal/institutional framework and initial atomization of ownership—is seen as the underlying cause.” Id. at 17.
36. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES, TEXT, MATERIALS 288
(6th ed. 1998) (citing Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE
ANTHROPOLOGY 167, 215 (1983)).
37. SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 36, at 288–89.
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governance theory, the fiduciary duty, for example, is imbued
with the legal sensibilities unique to its time and place.38
V. THE PUBLIC FACE OF LAW
In the search for answers to the conundrum of corporate governance, the focus has been primarily on what this paper calls
“public legal rules”: legislation, regulation, and to a much
lesser degree, efforts of the judiciary. These rules constitute the
public face of law. That much of the legal content of international standards has been drawn from statutory law is not surprising as statutory law is the most visible and accessible layer
of a legal system. Statutory law, however, may only be the tip
of the iceberg. The true significance of statutory law, too, may
not be what it seems in that its role and importance in positing
normative principles can vary from system to system.39
Drawing indicia of investor protection and good corporate
governance from national corporate statutes, the easiest and
most obvious sources, may also be highly misleading, depending
on the role of statutory law in a system (peripheral, supplemental, fundamental). An aging body of statutory law may also be
deceptive; legal systems are dynamic and statutory law inflexible, ossifying over time with concepts that no long function as
they once did.40 Moreover, corporate governance mechanisms
may not be in the “corporate law” at all; they may be found in a
civil code41 or even a constitution.42 Nonetheless, much of the
debate surrounding corporate governance and the operation of
capital markets has revolved around “public legal rules,” i.e.
legislation and, to a much lesser extent, judicial pronounce-

38. These “interaction effects impede putting our finger on one or two key
features as indicative of whether technical corporate law is overall good or
bad.” MARK J. ROE, CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS 32 (Colum. Law School, Ctr. for
Law and Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 186, Jan. 16, 2002), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=260582 (last visited May
20, 2005).
39. See Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Incomplete Law, 35 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 931 (2003).
40. See discussion of cumulative voting, infra Section VI(g).
41. For example, civil codes will often contain a title on legal persons in the
first book on persons. See infra text accompanying note 144 discussing cumulative voting and the Illinois constitution.
42. Id.
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ments.43 Often, where a transplanted legal rule has been disappointingly ineffective, greater judicial action, or enforcement,
has been called for.44
Unfortunately, this futile seesawing between demands for
better legislation and greater judicial enforcement ignores the
inherent complexity and dynamism of legal systems. As normative forces, even indigenous legislation and judicial enforcement
demonstrate different levels of effectiveness depending on the
particular legal system in which they are operating. Add
transplanted legal concepts to the equation, and the possible
outcomes become much more uncertain.
VI. PRIVATE LEGAL RULES AND LEGAL SENSIBILITIES
The debate over the role of legal rules in capital market development and corporate governance systems has focused on
the public face of law, ex ante legislation and its ex post enforcement through the judicial process. Largely overlooked in
this debate, however, has been the role of private legal rules (ex
ante and ex post) and legal sensibilities. Private legal rules are
established by contract (ex ante) and implemented and enforced
(ex post) by means of various dispute resolution mechanisms,
including arbitration, market discipline, “reputational hostagetaking,”45 and other subtle, situational factors. Professor Frank
43. It is no coincidence that reliance on legislation and the judiciary are
hallmarks of the U.S. legal system, in particular. See infra Section VI(g).
44. The following statement, with respect to Korean derivative law suits
(an ill-advised transplant for a number of legal and cultural reasons) is typical: “The small number of derivative lawsuits brought by minority shareholders in Korea reflects the shortcomings in enforcement practices. Between
1998 and 2002 a total of 13 suits were filed by minority shareholders.” Institute of International Finance, Inc., IIF Equity Advisory Group, Corporate
Governance in Korea An Investor Perspective Task Force Report, July 2003, at
4, available at http://www.iif.com/data/public/KoreaTaskForceReport_Final.
pdf (last visited May 20, 2005).
45. As an example of the interplay of public and private rules, Professor
Frank Partnoy of the University of San Diego recently presented a paper at
the Brookings Institution looking at the regulation of the derivatives markets
in the United States from this perspective. See Frank Partnoy, ISDA, NASD,
CFMA, and SDNY: The Four Horsemen of Derivatives Regulation?, in
BROOKINGS-WHARTON: PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 2–3 (Robert E. Litan &
Richard Herring eds., 2002). The derivatives markets in the United States
are regulated by a combination of private and public legal rules which operate
ex ante and ex post, and are presented schematically in Diagram A:
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Partnoy looked at the operation of ex ante and ex post public
and private rules recently in the context of the U.S. derivatives
markets and concluded that the “recent trend to privatize legal
rules applicable to derivatives is likely to continue.”46
The characterization of legal rules as public or private, however, does not capture the dynamism and complexity of legal
rules. Private and public legal rules interact, but also ebb and
flow over time. Rather than Partnoy’s static four-cornered box,
it is more useful to consider a continuum or spectrum along
Diagram A: Derivatives Regulation Framework

Ex Ante

Ex Post

Private

Public

Contract

Congress

(ISDA)

(CFMA)

Arbitration

Courts

(NASD)

(SDNY)

46. Id. at 36.
First are private ex ante legal rules developed primarily by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. (ISDA) for OTC derivatives (and by various exchanges and self-regulatory organizations
for exchange-traded derivatives). The recent trend has been toward
increased privatization of derivatives regulation, with trading volumes shifting from exchanges to OTC transactions, and this trend is
likely to continue…Second are private ex post legal rules applied by
arbitrators in disputes, particularly those of the National Association
of Securities Dealers (NASD)…Arbitration has numerous drawbacks,
especially uncertainty, and likely will not predominate in future adjudication of derivates disputes….Third are public ex ante legal rules,
including securities, commodities, and banking law and regulation,
but also including derivatives-specific rules. Historically, public
regulation in these areas has not achieved its goals; instead public legal rules too often have generated perverse incentives related to regulatory arbitrage, regulatory licenses, and regulatory competition….Fourth are public ex post legal rules, including rulings by
courts adjudicating derivatives disputes. Thus far, judges have shied
from deciding important issues in derivatives disputes, and end-users
of derivatives increasingly avoid litigation—even when losses are
large—because of the high costs of discovery and motion practice.
Id. at 2–3.
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which normative forces move and manifest themselves in different forms, sometimes at different times, sometimes contemporaneously. Along the continuum, in order of informality, are
legal sensibilities at one end, moving through standards of behavior or conduct, private legal rules, various intermediate or
hybrid forms of public/private rules,47 through to formal legislation and judicial action on the other end. A variation on Partnoy’s square would be:
Corporate Governance Rules
A Continuum
Legal
Sensibilities

Standards
of
Behavior

Ex
Ante

C moral
obligation

C

Ex
Post

C moral
opprobrium

QuasiPrvate/
Public
Rules

Private
Rules

voluntary
codes

C

contract

stock exchange
listing rules

C

Carbitration

Cspecialized

Cjudicial

arbitration

action

reputational
consequences

C

Public
Rules

Clegislation

Less formal=-----------------------------------------------------------------<More formal

In emerging, transitional, and developing economies, the corporate governance debate has spawned a more varied range of
responses than may at first be apparent. International standards are not necessarily producing cookie-cutter reforms operating across the board in a synchronized and predictable fashion. Credit this to the ingenuity of legal practitioners of all ilks,
especially in Latin America, and the inexorable process of indigenization of legal transplants.48

47. Intermediate or hybrid forms of rules are the product of the interaction
of various kinds of normative forces.
48. For a more detailed discussion of the Latin American initiatives, see
Cally Jordan & Mike Lubrano, How Effective Are Capital Markets in Exerting
Governance on Corporations?, in FINANCIAL SECTOR GOVERNANCE: THE ROLES
OF THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS 327 (Robert E. Litan et al. eds., 2002).
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A. Private Legal Rules: Powerful and Pervasive
Private legal rules are powerful and pervasive. Contract is at
the heart of any market and capital markets are no exception.
From the central contract of purchase and sale radiates an extensive network of complex contractual relations which make
the market function. The Euromarket (originally the Eurobond
market) is a highly successful capital market, which until recently has been governed virtually exclusively by various forms
of private legal rules.49 It has proven remarkably resistant to
the intrusion of legislation, although it may finally have been
caught in the regulatory net of the European Union.50
On the process of indigenization of legal transplants, see Legrand, supra note
20, at 111.
49. See Frank Graaf, Euromarket Finance: Issues of Euromarket Securities
and Syndicated Eurocurrency Loans, in EUROMARKET FINANCE 13–14 (1991).
50. One controversial aspect of the recently enacted EU Prospectus Directive is that it will impose greater restraints on issuances of securities in the
Euromarket, which has traditionally been viewed as a “professionals only”
market. See Council Directive 2003/71/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 64, available at
http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/l_345/l_34520031231en00640089.pdf. “Euro-securities”
have benefited from significant exemptions from regulation. The definition of
“euro-securities” appeared in the 1989 EU Prospectus Directive:
‘Euro-securities’ shall mean transferable securities which:
– are to be underwritten and distributed by a syndicate, at least
two of the members of which have their registered offices in different States, and
– are offered on a significant scale in one or more States other
than that of the issuer’s registered office, and
– may be subscribed for or initially acquired only through a credit
institution or other financial institution.
Council Directive 89/298/EEC, art. 3(f), 1989 O.J. (L 124) 8–15, available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:319
89L0298:EN:HTML. The definition carried over in 1993 to the EU Investment Services Directive. Council Directive 93/22/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 141) 27–
46, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do
?uri=CELEX:31993L0022:EN:HTML (now repealed by Council Directive
2004/39/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 126) 1).
As explained in GOWER’S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW:
All one need add is that the value of the business conducted on the
[Euromarket] is enormous (far greater than that on any stock exchange); that when trading starts it will normally be in lots exceeding
$(US) 25,000; and that there are efficiently organized clearing sys-
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At their origin, stock exchange listing rules, for example, are
private legal rules, adhered to by contractual arrangement.
This, in fact, is often the main source of their weakness as a
regulatory mechanism in case of market abuse; relying on contract, exchanges ordinarily may go no further than delisting
(resiliation of the contract to list) or resort to public censure (i.e.

tems….[T]he attitude of the United Kingdom (and of other countries)
has been studiously to exclude [euro-securities] from regulation—an
attitude acquiesced in by the European Commission. The arguments
of the [Association of International Bond Dealers] and its members
which have led to this ‘hands-off’ treatment are (i) that the market is
used by ‘professionals only’ and (ii) that if attempts were made to
regulate it more strictly the centre of its operations would move from
London to somewhere else in the European time zone (say Zurich
[Switzerland is not a member of the EU]), thus depriving the United
Kingdom (and, perhaps, the Community) of one of its more valuable
financial assets.
GOWER’S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 402 (6th ed. 1997). The Euromarket or, as Hal Scott calls it, the “international unregulated private placement market,” has “adopted what market participants call ‘international’
documentation or rules, developed by issuers, underwriters, and institutional
investors.” Hal S. Scott, Internationalization of Primary Public Securities
Markets, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 73 (2000) (emphasis added). Even in
the face of greater regulation to be imposed by the 2003 EU Prospectus Directive, the market is responding in an attempt to preserve enclaves free from
regulation:
From 1 July 05 the EU introduces a new regime which will make the
disclosure and continuing obligations even for “professionals only” offerings, more onerous. In justifiable fear of a flight of business (I
have been advising the Swiss Stock Exchange on the implementation
of its new Eurobond listing regime) both London and [Luxembourg]
are planning to establish new ‘unregulated’ listing regimes outside
the scope of the new EU regulated regime. Interesting times in the
Eurobond market!
Correspondence with Nick Eastwell, Partner, Linklaters (Feb. 21, 2005) (on
file with author). Other “unregulated” markets are seeking to capitalize on
the greater regulation of the traditional Euro-market. “Switzerland is also
proposing to continue the old EU Eurobond regime by permitting listings in
currencies other than Swiss Francs. The Channel Islands are proposing a
similar market as is Singapore….All in all, it is not clear which debt market
non-EU issuers will choose.” Correspondence with Peter Noble, member of
the International Primary Market Association (IPMA) Working Group dealing
with the EU Prospectus Directive and Partner, Ogilvy Renault (Feb. 21,
2005).
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invoke the power of legal sensibilities).51 Over time, listing
rules have been transformed in many cases by an overlay of
public legal rules, so called “statutory backing” or subjugation
to supervisory oversight, thus evolving into a form of semi- or
quasi- public legal rule.
Contract, too, is at the heart of the corporate entity. Modern
U.S. legal theory looks at the corporation as a “nexus of contracts.”52 In the interest of efficiency, corporate law (public legal
rules) acts primarily to establish a standard form of “contract,”
or default rules, for the internal organization of corporations.53
The incorporators themselves, and subsequent shareholders,
may vary these rules (and often do) virtually in their entirety by
contract in the private or close corporation. Close corporations,
private companies, are the predominant corporate form
throughout the world, in some cases comprising 99% of incorpo-

51. See also Jordan & Lubrano, supra note 48 (discussing mandatory
arbitration of shareholder disputes required of companies listing on Level 2 of
the Novo Mercado, the Sao Paulo Exchange’s recently created “corporate
governance board”).
52.
Law and economic theorists conceptualize the corporation in terms of
contract law. A corporation can be viewed as a nexus of contracts
through which various claimants such as creditors, workers, shareholders, and consumers enter into agreements. Private contracts are
an efficient means to lower transaction costs in the agency relationship between the shareholders and managers. One can view the articles of incorporation and the bylaws as a contract between the shareholders and the managers setting out the rules governing their relationship. This private ordering through contracts allows the parties
to provide rules to maximize value and minimize costs. Under this
view, corporate law should provide the basic terms of these contracts
(that is, default rules), but the shareholders and the managers should
be allowed to change the terms, thus providing an optimal and mutually agreeable system.
ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW
115–16 (1999).
53. In the United Kingdom, and many other Commonwealth jurisdictions,
contract is still the basis of the formation of a company; the memorandum of
association, the contract among the founding members, is registered in order
to benefit from limited liability and legal personality. The contractual basis of
the company had long been a theoretical impediment to the creation of one
shareholder companies; it takes two to tango and two (at least in the common
law, if not in the civil law) to contract. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 6 (1914).
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rations or registrations.54 They are primarily creatures of contract and rely on contract, in the form of by-laws and shareholder agreements in particular, for their operation.
The primacy of contract in the market also underpins the
dominant regulatory approach to the capital markets (and, secondarily, corporate governance), which is the U.S. disclosurebased regime. The nature of these public, disclosure-based
rules is determined by their deference to the private legal rules
of the market: essentially, buyer beware. What are the characteristics of contract? It is consensual, flexible, and, optimally,
both self-enforcing and independent of political process. Private
legal rules can, thus, circumvent the impediments to financial
market development thrown up by the “political structure
within a country.”55
Each characteristic of contract can vary in degree, but its
consensual nature is arguably its defining characteristic. Standard form contracts, rife in the securities industry, are largely
inflexible, either for the sake of predictability and convenience
or due to the superior bargaining power of industry participants, but they are still consensual. By-laws or industry association rules are a variation on standard form contracts.56 In
becoming a member of the organization or company, the member agrees to abide by the rules. Contract thus forms the basis
of so-called self-regulatory organizations prevalent in the AngloAmerican securities industry.
54. For example, at the time of the author’s work on proposals for modernized companies legislation in Hong Kong, nearly 99% of companies registered
in Hong Kong were private companies. “Of the 483,181 companies registered
in Hong Kong as of 31 December 1997, 477,140 are private companies.”
CALLY JORDAN, REVIEW OF THE HONG KONG COMPANIES ORDINANCE –
CONSULTANCY REPORT 30 (1997). For information on the German equivalent
of the close corporation or private company, see also SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 36, at 923 (“In Germany and in most countries that have followed its
model, the limited liability company (GmbH) is enormously popular. By 1991,
Germany had about 465,660 limited liability companies (GmbHs) as opposed
to only 2,800 stock corporations (AGs)….”).
55. See generally RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 8.
56. The derivation of the word “by-law” is interesting in this respect. It is
believed to come from the Old Norse language “byrlaw”: a local custom or law
of a manor or district whereby disputes over boundaries and trespass were
settled without recourse to the public courts of law or a regulation or ordinance
agreed to by consent in baronial court. NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 310–11 (2d ed. 1993).
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There are, however, several drawbacks to private legal rules.
In the absence of agreement, there is impasse. Then there must
be recourse to public law, which is rigid, prescriptive, circumscribed, and, in the case of legislation, at least, subject to the
vagaries of political process.57 Nevertheless, in certain circumstances and certain legal systems, public legal rules are more
effective than private legal rules.
B. Private Legal Rules are Important
The debate over regulation of capital markets and governance
of corporations since the early 1990s has primarily been an Anglo-American one.58 Not surprisingly, many governance mechanisms that have recently proliferated find their origins in Anglo-American law and practice.59 Although the debate surged
into public prominence ten to fifteen years ago (for a variety of
reasons),60 it has been the daily bread of lawyers and accountants for a hundred and fifty years or more.
Over time, fairly standardized private legal rules developed
in the context of negotiated partnership contracts, shareholder
agreements, and private company by-laws. These private legal
57. The judiciary and judicial action may not be immune to the vagaries of
political process either. Despite the admirable independence of the U.S. judiciary, the appointment process is highly politicized.
58. The debate has, in more recent years, been picked up with vigor in Asia
and continental Europe, where the issues and concepts are being recast in a
different corporate and legal context. See, for example, the efforts of the
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), at http://www.ecgi.org, and
the Asian Corporate Governance Association (ACGA), at http://www.acgaasia.org.
59. For example, voluntary codes, cumulative voting and class actions. See
discussion infra Sections VI(e), (f), (g).
60. Some of the reasons include U.K. privatizations of the 1980s creating a
vocal shareholder base wielding political power, the tabloid scandals of the
Maxwell affair, outrageous U.S. executive compensation, the glamorization of
Wall Street, etc. The London Stock Exchange and the UK Society of Accountants worked together to look at the issues, primarily involving financial accountability of the board of directors. Their report, the “Cadbury Report,”
proved extraordinarily influential in shaping the ensuing world-wide corporate governance debates. See Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992), available at http://www.blindtiger.co.uk/IIA/uploads
/2c9103-ea9f7e9fbe--7e3a/Cadbury.pdf (last visited May 20, 2005) [hereinafter
Cadbury Report].
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rules were designed to balance the ongoing economic interests
of participants and, if necessary, provide egress from the enterprise and dispute resolution without recourse to the courts. In
commercial matters, the courts would be a last resort.61
In the United States, possibly for reasons discussed below,
some of these contractual governance mechanisms metamorphosed into various kinds of public legal rules, particularly in
the case of private or close corporations. Among these rules
were tag-along rights in case of change of control, puts and calls
to provide an exit, valuation mechanisms to determine economic
interests, disinterested voting techniques to deal with conflicts
of interest, buy-out or appraisal mechanisms triggered by certain events, and arbitration and non-judicial dispute resolution.62 Some of these contractual governance mechanisms were
adapted and crossed over to the realm of public corporations.
Their outlines, for example, are readily discernible in the Williams Act,63 which is the source of U.S. tender offer rules.
These contractual governance mechanisms are not exclusive
to the United States. For example, these private legal rules
figure prominently, in different forms, in recent Latin American
initiatives, such as the so-called corporate governance board of
the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange.64 Private legal rules, contract,
are important in and of themselves but are also important in
two other respects. First, private legal rules generate markettested solutions that can, over time, provide the basis for public
legal rules of greater general applicability, as has been the experience in the United States. Secondly, as Professor Partnoy
observes, over time, public legal rules may migrate back to the
private sector in search of a more effective form of expression.

61. Litigation can be a devastatingly slow and expensive process that can
destroy a business or commercial relationship.
62. These mechanisms, for the most part, are now statutory in nature in
state corporate law following the MBCA. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§
214 (cumulative voting), 262 (appraisal rights) (2001).
63. Williams Act of 1968, 15 U.S.C. § 78(d)–(f) (2000).
64. For a detailed discussion, see Jordan & Lubrano, supra note 48.

File: Jordan.MACRO.06.16.05.doc

2005]

Created on: 6/16/2005 3:26 PM

Last Printed: 6/17/2005 1:35 PM

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

1005

C. Legal Traditions: Different Balances in Terms of the
Effectiveness of Private and Public Legal Rules
Even within the common law tradition, there are significant
differences between English (now Commonwealth) and U.S.
traditions. The U.S. common law tradition branched off over
two hundred years ago at the time of the American Revolution65
and, in some interesting respects, has greater affinities with the
continental European tradition than with the English common
law: “Law in the United States is generally seen as adhering to
a common law ‘family,’ but today this is far from obvious.”66
This fundamental misunderstanding of the U.S. legal system
has distorted an otherwise thought-provoking analysis of the
relationship of legal origins and development of financial systems.67 “The particular genius of US law…has been its constructive combination of elements of both civil and common
law.”68
The U.S. and English traditions do share a common characteristic, although it may find a different manner of expression
in each system: heavy reliance on ex post public legal rules
through enforcement in the courts. As every common law student learns in the first week of law school, there is no right
without a [judicial] remedy.69 This remedial legacy endows pro65. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2–5 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. ed., 1996).
66. H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 248, 251 (2d ed.
2004).
In many respects US law represents a deliberate rejection of common
law principles, with preference being given to more affirmative ideas
clearly derived from civil law. These were not somehow reinvented in
the United States but taken over directly from civilian sources in a
massive process of change in adherence to legal information in the
nineteenth century.
Id. at 248.
67. See supra note 2.
68. GLENN, supra note 66, at 251 (emphasis added) (“Grant Gilmore observed that U.S. lawyers were ‘convinced eighteenth-century rationalists,’ in
the French tradition, while at the same time, U.S. law would represent ‘the
arrogation of unlimited power by the judges.’”).
69. Id. at 228
(“‘Where there is no remedy there is no wrong [quoting Maitland].’
So the common law came to be composed of a series of procedural
routes (usually referred to as remedies) to get before a jury and state
one’s case….In contemporary language the common law was there-
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cedural elements of the law and the judicial system in common
law traditions with great importance. This centrality of procedural law and the judicial system is not necessarily recognized
or shared in other legal traditions.70
In the English common law, the importance of judicial action,
case law, and ex post public legal rules continue to dominate
statutory, or written, law, the ex ante public legal rules. The
English common law system demonstrates to this day a surprising aversion to law as legislation, to ex ante public legal rules.71
fore a law of procedure; whatever substantive law existed was hidden
by it, ‘secreted’ in its ‘interstices,’ in the language of Maine.”).
70. Id. (“The procedure was, and is, unique in the world and may be today
the most distinctive feature of the common law.”).
71. In the company law area, for example, both the U.K. and Hong Kong
(while still British territory) demonstrated an active resistance to creating
statutory formulations of directors’ duties and the derivative action, preferring to rely on a tangled mass of case law dating back to the 1840s. See
JORDAN supra note 54, at 122
(“Until recently, it seemed that the United Kingdom was moving in
the direction of statutory standards [of directors’ duties]. According
to the U.K. Department of Trade and Industry working group on Directors Duties, there was ‘support emerging for the codification of directors’ duties similar to the approach adopted in other Commonwealth countries. The DTI favours a reduced Part X coupled with a
‘statement’ of directors’ duties’ (Great Britain, Department of Trade
and Industry, DTI’s Programme for the Reform of Company Law –
Progress Report (London: Department of Trade and Industry, 11 June
1996)). A subsequent Progress Report (October 1996) indicates, however, that such an initiative has been again derailed. The U.K. Jenkins Committee, in 1962, considered that a general statement of the
basic principles underlying the fiduciary relationship of directors towards their companies would be useful to directors and others concerned with company management. The Second Report in Hong
Kong in 1973 agreed and so recommended. The SCCLR has also so
recommended. Efforts were made to develop a statutory formulation
of directors’ fiduciary duties in Hong Kong, the most recent being the
Companies (Amendment) Bill 1991. The Bill was not enacted due to
objections expressed in particular by the Law Society. The Law Society was of the view (among other things) that any attempt to draft a
statutory formulation of directors’ fiduciary duties would be incomplete and that it was better to continue with the present system
where a director should consult his professional advisors whenever a
question involving his fiduciary duties to the company arose. When
the Bill was withdrawn, the Government encouraged the private sector to draft guidelines to better inform directors of their duties. In
1995 the Hong Kong branch of the Institute of Directors published
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Large and complex swathes of English law are not found in
written legislation. Trust law, from which is derived the concept of “fiduciary duties” so important to corporate governance
in the Anglo-American system, is a prime example; its fundamental principles remain judge-made, with ex post public legal
rules as their source.
In some instances, there are not even judge-made rules to
look to in England. For example, England has no written constitution; rather, in its place are “parliamentary conventions”
which developed over long periods of time and operate on a consensual basis.72 These parliamentary conventions are imbued
with “legal sensibilities,” but not less effective for that reason.
Fiduciary duty, too, draws much of its residual power from the
influences of legal sensibilities, leftovers from an earlier time
when they enjoyed greater formal normative force.73 The conGuidelines for Directors which was, in part, intended to be responsive
to the need for some private sector guidelines. Of special interest in
this area is the SEHK Listing Rules’ formulation of directors’ duties,
which demonstrates its affinity to modern statutory formulations.”).
A form of statutory derivative action was also resisted in Hong Kong (although there were other considerations at work as well). In recommending
the creation of such a statutory provision, the Consultancy Report stated that
On balance, in the interests of certainty, simplicity and conformity
with other Commonwealth jurisdictions, a statutory derivative action
is desirable. The prophylactic effect of such an action is salutary. It
also appears to be the only way in which to lay to rest the unruly
ghost of Foss v. Harbottle [1843], which it must be remembered, was
th
decided before the advent of even 19 century statutory company law.
The U.K. case law on the rule in Foss v. Harbottle has taken some
unfortunate turns in recent years creating unnecessary hurdles for
shareholders in international disputes being played out in the United
Kingdom. Characterised as a procedural rule under principles of
U.K. private international law, the intricacies of the rule have been
superimposed on shareholders of companies incorporated in other jurisdictions which provide more modern remedies. There is some evidence that this line of U.K. case law would also be applied in Hong
Kong.
Id. at 152.
72. What a way to run a country some might say. For a discussion of parliamentary conventions, see Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981]
S.C.R. 753 (Can.) at 772.
73. The fiduciary duty has its origins in medieval ecclesiastic courts in
England; at the time, canon, or ecclesiastical, law and the ecclesiastic courts
were a very real and present source of normative propositions. See Mary Szto,
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cept of fiduciary duty, so fundamental to Anglo-American corporate governance, does not transplant well, if at all, because of
its dependence on specific court structures and cultural and historic “legal sensibilities.”74
The U.S. legal tradition shows no such reticence in the use of
legislation, ex ante public legal rules. In this respect, proclivities of the U.S. legal tradition are more in line with those of
continental Europe.75 It is no accident that the United States
has a Uniform Commercial Code,76 Bankruptcy Code, and any
number of other state and federal codes.77 The formative decades of the early Republic were very much influenced by French
legal thought and institutions.78
As for continental European legal traditions, which serve as
the basis for the legal systems of much of the world outside the
Limited Liability Company Morality: Fiduciary Duties in Historical Context,
23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 61, 61 (2004).
74. The Chinese Companies Law of 1993 crudely ‘codified’ certain aspects
of the fiduciary duty: managers are prohibited from accepting bribes and from
depositing company funds in their personal bank accounts, for example. See
Company Law of the People's Republic of China, arts. 211, 214 (Adopted at
the Fifth Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People's
Congress, 1993), available at http://www.cclaw.net/download/companylaw.asp
(last visited May 20, 2005). See also id. art. 59, para. 2 (“A directors [sic],
supervisor, or the general manager may not abuse their authorities by accepting bribes or generating other illegal income, and may not convert company
property.”); art. 60, para. 2. (“A director or the general manager may not deposit company assets into an account in his own name or in any other individual's name.”); art. 61 (“A director or the general manager may not engage in
the same business as the company in which he serves as a director or the general manager either for his own account or for any other person's account, or
engage in any activity detrimental to company interests. If a director or the
general manager engages in any of the above mentioned business or activity,
any income so derived shall be turned over to the company.”). Note that the
latter part of art. 61 is a classic statement of the fiduciary law remedy for
breach of the prohibition on acting in a conflict of interest.
75. See generally GLENN, supra note 66 (discussing global legal traditions).
76. It is a sometimes overlooked fact that the Uniform Commercial Code in
the United States was inspired directly by the German Commercial Code.
“The principal architect of the Code, the late Professor Karl N. Llewellyn, had
spent considerable time in Germany, and there can be no doubt that some of
the Code’s important features were inspired by his study of German law.”
SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 36, at 20–21.
77. For more on the history of the Bankruptcy Code, see DAVID A. SKEEL,
DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA (2001).
78. See generally GLENN, supra note 66.
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Commonwealth, their most important defining characteristic
may be the importance of “written law,” ex ante public legal
rules, particularly as embodied in the great nineteenth-century
civil and commercial codes. These countries are pays du droit
ecrit, which translates as “countries of written law.”79 If in the
common law world there is no right (or, more correctly, no
wrong) without a remedy, then in the continental European
tradition there is no right without a written law. In the continental European context, judicial pronouncements are of relatively (and the stress here is on relatively) little importance.80
A related characteristic of continental European law, virtually unknown in the United Kingdom, is the hierarchy of laws:
in decreasing order, constitution, code, statute, decree, and
regulation. As in a game of cards, a civil or commercial code
provision will always trump a statutory law, which is considered “specialized” or subordinate legislation, subject to the
overarching principles of the code. Any subsequent legal transplant which takes the form of statutory enactment will be subservient to even pre-existing civil code provisions which may
date back a century or more.

79. “Pays du droit ecrit” being a term identifying a certain geographic area
(originally, that region of France south of the Loire) and a legal tradition (deriving from a continuation of Roman law somewhat modified by Germanic
custom).
At the time of the withdrawal of the Romans [from the south of what
is now modern France], Roman provincials (who in accordance with
the personality principle were governed by Roman law) by far outnumbered Germanic settlers.
The result was that Roman
law…continued to be the law of the land, modified to some extent by
Germanic custom.
HAHLO & KAHN, supra note 21, at 509.
80. As with all such generalizations, the interest lies in the exceptions.
However, see GLENN, supra note 66, at 145–46
(“There are problems…with the notion of judicial independence in the
civilian tradition. Given the ancien régime, nobody wants a ‘gouvernement des juges’, so the primacy of the codes, and legislation in
general, is reinforced by ongoing skepticism towards, and even surveillance of (through control of the career structure) the civilian judiciary.”).
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D. Effective Rules: Form and Substance
The preceding discussion has not been idle dalliance in the
fascinating, but irrelevant, backwaters of comparative law. The
effectiveness of a governance mechanism in a particular legal
system will relate to the form it takes. To the extent that the
LLSV literature recognized that legal families do matter, it provided a valuable insight.81 Pistor, too, is correct in her observation that the manner in which a legal concept is introduced or
transplanted matters.82 Equally, the form which a rule takes
matters.83 Some of the otherwise “inexplicable” consequences,
such as the failures of the waves of capital markets and corporate governance initiatives, can be traced to a failure to recognize the importance of these observations.
Some of the most popular governance mechanisms, such as
voluntary codes, cumulative voting and class actions, may not
survive transplantation to another legal system because they
are an inappropriate form of rule. Others may be fundamentally incompatible with the underlying legal structure. The
concept of fiduciary duty, for example, is notable for its absence
in other legal systems despite its importance as a mechanism
for corporate governance in the Anglo-American tradition. Fiduciary duty is a concept too complex, exotic, and imbued with
legal sensibilities to take root easily elsewhere.84
E. Voluntary Codes of Corporate Governance
Voluntary codes of corporate governance have probably been
the most popular governance mechanism of the 1990s and have
proliferated, irrespective of legal tradition, corporate ownership
patterns or level of development of the capital market. These
codes trace their immediate origins to the 1992 Cadbury Report
in the United Kingdom.85 None would question the extraordi81. As noted above, the LLSV “legal origins” literature fundamentally misunderstood the nature of these legal families.
82. See BERKOWITZ ET AL., supra note 9.
83. See Jordan & Lubrano, supra note 48.
84. Again, the exceptions to this generalization are of interest. See supra
note 74 and accompanying text for the examples of codification of fiduciary
duties in Chinese companies law and the discussion infra note 94 and accompanying text of the introduction of trust law principles in the Quebec and
Mexican civil codes.
85. See Cadbury Report, supra note 60.
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nary influence of the Cadbury Report in spawning a world-wide
interest in corporate governance and the mechanisms to promote it. In the United Kingdom, its country of origin, the current manifestation of the Cadbury Report and its subsequent
recommendations is the Combined Code.”86 The most significant feature of the Combined Code is that, contrary to the implication in its title, it is not written law but, rather, is a “voluntary” code. In the continental European tradition, a “voluntary”
code is an oxymoron. A “code,” in the European tradition, is
written law of high normative force.87
So, what is the Combined Code, if not legislation? It is a code
in another sense in that it is “a set of rules on any subject, esp.,
the prevalent morality of a society or class; an individual’s
standard of moral behaviour.”88 The Combined Code is a code of
conduct and ethics informed by legal sensibilities. The Combined Code is not even a form of private legal rule; rather, it is
no more than a set of suggested guidelines. Absent is the binding force of contract that a set of industry association rules
might possess by virtue of contractual membership obligations.
The questions then become, first, how effective the Combined
Code can be and, second, why this choice of form is appropriate?
To begin, the Combined Code can be reasonably effective in the
United Kingdom, all other things being equal.89 Remember that
the United Kingdom relies on unwritten parliamentary conventions in lieu of a written constitution and has a respectable, if
now frayed, tradition of the use of moral suasion as a regulatory
technique.90 The Combined Code is not the only instance of a
“voluntary” code either in the United Kingdom; the “City Code”

86. Committee on Corporate Governance, Combined Code, Principles of
Good Governance and Code of Best Practice (1998) (Eng.), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ukla/lr_comcode3.pdf#search='Committee%20on%
20Corporate%20Governance,%20â€
€ œThe%20Combined%20Codeâ€
€ %20Lond
on,%201998' (last visited May 20, 2005).
87. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines “code” as: “A written
body of laws so arranged as to avoid inconsistency and overlap.” SHORTER
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 441 (5th ed. 2002).
88. Id.
89. There have been criticisms of its effectiveness, but all things are relative.
90. Tea with the Governor of the Bank of England, for example, prior to
recent regulatory reforms.
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or Takeover Code91 was not written legislation, it too was a “voluntary” code. The legal sensibilities in this particular area
have been vital enough in the United Kingdom, at least until
the very recent past,92 to support the effectiveness of voluntary
codes as a normative proposition.
As to the second question concerning choice of form, the answer is more elusive. It is not as though the United Kingdom
emulates existing models when embracing a voluntary code.
Several of the substantive recommendations of the Cadbury
Report, such as the use of audit, remuneration and nomination
committees are taken directly from the listing rules of the New
York Stock Exchange.93 These rules we would characterize as
semi- or quasi- public rules because their binding nature derives from contract but they are also subject to regulatory oversight of Securities and Exchange Commission, a public agency.
The use of audit committees by New York Stock Exchangelisted companies was not a pious wish; it was a mandatory requirement. To trace the origins of the audit committee recommendation even a little further back, it is found in legislative

91. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, City Code on Takeovers and Mergers
and the Rules Governing Substantial Acquisitions of Shares (2002) (Eng.),
available at http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2005).
92. The UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) was created under the
Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8 (Eng.) and assumed its powers
and responsibilities on December 1, 2001. It is an independent nongovernmental regulator, created by statute and exercising statutory powers.
The FSA is a “unitary” regulator, directly responsible for banking, insurance
and the investment business. In its own words, the “FSA takes a radically
different approach to regulation from that of its predecessors.” FINANCIAL
SERVICES AUTHORITY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY
7 (2001), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/fsa_intro.pdf (last visited May 20, 2005). The internationalization of capital markets and the consequent pressures exerted from both sides of the Atlantic are likely a prime
contributor to the decision by the UK authorities to radically change their
approach to financial services regulation.
93. For example, the “audit committee” was introduced by the NYSE in
1978. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls to Fight Fraud, Terrorism, and Other Ills, 29 J. CORP. L. 267, 336 (2004).
For a description of the audit committee’s duties, see Constitution of the New
York Stock Exchange, art. IV, § 12(3), available at http://rules.nyse.com/
nysetools/Exchangeviewer.asp?SelectedNode=chp_1_1_4&manual=/nyse/
constitution/constitution/.
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form, as an ex ante public legal rule, even earlier.94 So, there is
one rule with three different, related, manifestations, which
begs the question of their relative effectiveness.
The question remains, however, of the efficacy and wisdom of
a voluntary code. A number of virtues can be cited, among
them flexibility, responsiveness, sensitivity to industry specific
concerns and considerations, the usual virtues of private legal
rules. Underlying these rationales, though, the peculiar British
aversion to written legislation, ex ante public legal rules, also
shines through. There may also be even subtler forces at work
in influencing the form these rules have taken in the United
Kingdom.
For example, the Cadbury Report in 1992 focused on the
board of directors, its composition and responsibilities.95 The
directors of English companies, like their U.S. counterparts, are
subject to fiduciary duties derived from very medieval concepts
of trust law. Early nineteenth-century English (and U.S.)96
business enterprises were often organized as trust vehicles with
the director roles being assumed by “real” trustees. Trustees
are subject to strict fiduciary duties of impartiality and accountability which, due to a quirk of medieval history, were enforced by a separate ecclesiastic court system known as Courts
of Equity.97 Fiduciary duties are triggered whenever there is a
separation of ownership from management of property98 and,
thus, easily carried over to the obligations of company and cor94. In 1975, the new Canada Business Corporations Act had introduced a
provision making audit committees mandatory for federal publicly traded
companies. Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C., ch. 44 § 171 (1975).
The interesting twist here is that, although inspired in many respects by the
U.S. Model Business Corporations Act, the Canadian legislation was also subject to the beneficent influences of the Quebec Civil Code (itself at that time
based largely on the French Napoleonic Code), in terms of legislative approach
and drafting techniques, and with its continental European bias in favor of
written law, ex ante public legal rules.
95. See generally Allison Dabbs Garrett, Themes and Variations: The Convergence of Corporate Governance Practices in Major World Markets, 32 DENV.
J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 147 (2004) (discussing global corporate governance practices).
96. See Gashwiler v. Willis, 33 Cal. 11 (1867).
97. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND
MATERIALS 6–8 (3rd ed. 2002).
98. See FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS,
AND FUTURE INTERESTS 1299–1364 (Lawrence W. Waggoner et al. eds., 2002).
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porate directors. Enforced by the Courts of Equity, fiduciary
duties were suffused with moral righteousness and legal sensibilities. A voluntary code for directors’ duties (in the Oxford
English Dictionary sense of a vehicle establishing “a standard of
moral behaviour”),99 such as the Combined Code, is very much
in keeping with the constructs of this tradition.
The specificity to the United Kingdom of the choice of a voluntary code of corporate governance should be obvious by now.
The question then becomes how effective such voluntary codes
could be elsewhere. Would they transplant well, even if not imposed through conquest or colonization?100 Could they be transplanted at all in continental European law systems or the complex hybrid legal systems of Asia? For example, it would be
hard to imagine the French (or Americans, for that matter) jettisoning their beloved constitution for a variant of English parliamentary convention.101 Further, why have voluntary codes of
corporate governance been so immensely popular?
F. Voluntary Codes and International Capital Markets
Here is where the capital markets may, ironically, be producing a perverse effect on corporate governance initiatives. International capital markets have been so dominated in recent
years by Anglo-American law and practices that the spillover
into other law and practice, regardless of legal tradition, has
99. SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 441 (5th ed. 2002).
100. See BERKOWITZ ET AL., supra note 9.
101. The sorry saga of the recent Russian code of corporate governance
demonstrates the muddle which follows an attempt to integrate a voluntary
code into a continental European system unable to recognize the concept. See
Jordan & Lubrano, supra note 48, at 349
(“Russia’s new code of corporate governance had a more dirigiste
provenance than Mexico’s….A committee selected by the FCSM [Russian Federal Commission on Securities Markets] was assigned the
task of preparing a final code within a year….As initially conceived,
the code was to be a (quite lengthy) compendium of existing law,
regulation, and FCSM interpretation, as well as ‘recommended’ practices not necessarily grounded in the existing legal and regulatory
framework. An early draft of some of the code’s chapters indicated
that the document would not likely be very clear about which of its
provisions were restatements of existing law, which represented
FCSM interpretation of the existing framework, and which were to be
regarded as merely hortatory.”).
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been inevitable, if uneven. Some spillover may be ineffective
because the mechanisms introduced are incompatible with or
unknown to the underlying legal system, fiduciary duties for
example. In other cases, the transplanted legal concepts may
contradict civil or commercial code provisions. The newlyintroduced elements may then be simply trumped, rendered
ineffective, by older civil code (or even constitutional) provisions
which are higher in the legal hierarchy.
Other legal mechanisms, voluntary codes possibly among
them, may be detrimental to developing better corporate governance. Deliberately introducing an ineffective, but internationally recognized, corporate governance delivery mechanism
such as a voluntary code may cause political interests to divert
attention from approaches which could be more effective, but
also more disruptive to the cozy corporate and political status
quo.102 Such strategies are not restricted to developing economies. The German corporate governance code, a voluntary code
introduced in 2002, provides an example. Justice Minister
Herta Daubler-Gmelin “argued that while the code contained no
sanctions for non-compliance, ‘the capital market will provide
very effective sanctions’ for those that chose to ignore it.”103 The
Financial Times editorial writer was skeptical at the time of
introduction of the voluntary code, stating flatly that it would
do “little to nudge German corporate governance towards a
more investor-friendly model.”104 This skepticism has been
largely vindicated by subsequent events; three years later the
voluntary code is considered “a failure” and plans are afoot to
replace it with written legislation.105

102. See RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 8.
103. Sven Clausen & Hugh Williamson, Berlin Announces Voluntary Business Code, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002, at 7.
104. German Takeover, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002, at 12
(“Common rules for corporate takeovers have become a test for Europe’s capacity to reform itself. Thanks to the conservatism of German business and
the refusal of the Berlin government to look beyond narrow political interests,
is one that Europe is likely to fail. Despite the eye-catching call for greater
disclosure of executive pay, Germany’s new voluntary code, published yesterday, does little to nudge German corporate governance towards a more investor-friendly model.”).
105. See Patrick Jenkins & Hugh Williamson, Executives Under Pressure on
Pay, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2005, at 16
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On the other hand, as ineffective as such a mechanism may
be domestically in directly raising standards of corporate governance, it may have a signaling effect in the international
markets. To the extent corporations participate in the international capital markets (perhaps only a tiny fraction of a country’s corporate universe), other more effective corporate governance mechanisms would be engaged through foreign listing
rules, compliance with U.S. securities laws and regulations,
inter alia. Where there is little interest in international capital
markets, however, there may be little interest in triggering the
signaling effect of introduction of a domestically inappropriate,
but internationally recognized, corporate governance mechanism.106
G. Cumulative Voting and Class Actions
Like voluntary codes, cumulative voting mechanisms and
class actions have also popped up around the world.107 Early
LLSV literature, which identified the presence of both of these

(“A group of 21 Social Democrat members of the German parliament
will today table a draft bill to force company executives to disclose details of their remuneration and bring to an end a deep-rooted culture
of secrecy in the country’s boardrooms. The bill, drafted in consultation with corporate governance expert Theodor Baums, comes in response to what the legislators see as the failure of a three-year-old
voluntary code to prompt disclosure.”).
106. Tunisia, for example, with a very “pure” French civil law tradition, has
recently introduced new corporate law designed to improve various aspects of
governance, but has little interest in a voluntary code of good corporate governance (although there is some greater interest in judicially oriented statutory shareholder remedies). See, e.g., Code des sociétés commerciales, Loi no.
2000-93 du 3 novembre 2000, art. 477. As the head of the Centre des etudes
juridiques et judiciaries explained to the author in an interview in Tunis in
February 2001, the concept of a voluntary code of corporate governance is
inconsistent with the Tunisian legal tradition which prefers structural adjustments to the corporate law, ex ante public legal rules. To the extent there
is little interest in participating in international capital markets by Tunisian
corporations (non-domestic activity is more likely to be focused on France and
Italy), there is little need to send a signal to the international capital markets.
107. See, e.g., Sang-Woo Nam & Il Chong Nam, Corporate Governance in
Asia: Recent Evidence from Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Thailand and Malaysia, Asian Development Bank Institute (2004), available at http://
www.adbi.org/files/2003.11.10.paper.recent.evidence.pdf#search='SangWoo%2
0Nam,%20Il%20Chong%20Nam' (last updated May 20, 2005).
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so called “anti-director” mechanisms as indicative of the presence of effective corporate governance regimes, has no doubt
been influential in this regard.108 Statutory cumulative voting
and class actions originated in the United States and are procedural mechanisms (note their procedural nature) designed to
enhance minority shareholder representation at the board level,
on the one hand, and promote management accountability
through judicial recourse, on the other.
Again, the primary virtue of such governance mechanisms is
their signaling effect to international capital markets. U.S institutional investors recognize the signal, which means the domestic market has become aware of and taken up the corporate
governance debate.109 Cumulative voting and class actions are
like little flags attracting the momentary attention of the international capital markets. As effective mechanisms of promoting
better governance in the corporate sector domestically, however,
they will likely prove disappointing. First of all, cumulative
voting in particular, does little to promote corporate governance
even in the United States. Secondly, as transplants, both
mechanisms may prove to be the wrong form of legal rule for
most of the legal systems in which they find themselves. In addition, these mechanisms may have been transplanted by a
method (i.e. imposed rather than voluntarily adopted) likely to
result in their failure to perform as expected.110
108. See supra note 2.
109. The author participated in a “road show” meeting in New York City in
2002 where the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange (BOVESPA) was making a presentation to major U.S. institutional investors on its new corporate governance
board, the Novo Mercado. One institutional investor inquired as to whether
Brazil had cumulative voting provisions in its corporate law (it didn’t). What
the investor failed to realize, and what the BOVESPA failed to mention, was
that pending legislation in Brazil was to provide a mechanism for direct board
representation by minority shareholders holding a certain percentage of
shares, in fact, a much better, substantive right than a cumulative voting
mechanism. For a more detailed description of the Novo Mercado, see Jordan
& Lubrano, supra note 48, at 341.
110. Adoption of cumulative voting and class actions has often been highly
recommended or otherwise “imposed” by international financial institutions.
See, e.g., Joongi Kim, Recent Amendments to the Korean Commercial Code and
their Effects on International Competition, 21 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 273, 328
(2000) (“Furthermore, Korea is facing considerable peer pressure from international organizations such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (‘OECD’) to modify its corporate regulation to reflect newly

File: Jordan.MACRO.06.16.05.doc

1018

Created on: 6/16/2005 3:26 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 6/17/2005 1:35 PM

[Vol. 30:3

The introduction of cumulative voting and class actions in
Korea provides an example of such failure. The Korean legal
system, at its most formal level, has been strongly influenced
historically by German models (originally via Japan) and, for
that reason, would demonstrate a predilection for ex ante public
legal rules, written law.111 As in the other legal systems with
which Korea shares its heritage, procedural rules and reliance
on ex post public legal rules, judicial recourse, are limited in
their effectiveness. For example, in Korea, the “Commercial
Code provision governing derivative actions [another U.S. procedural transplant relying on judicial action] for practical purposes has been dead paper.”112
An additional complication in the case of Korean corporate
law has been the ongoing dysfunctionalities associated with earlier transplants from U.S. law:
Most of the faults in Korean corporations can be traced to the
failure of the corporate regulatory framework. In essence, the
management structure established to oversee business firms
did not function as expected. Corporate actors, such as shareholders, the board of directors, representative directors, and
auditors, did not fulfill their respective statutory duties. One
expert describes the anomalous situation whereby Korean
boards would monitor themselves as being functionally in between the dual-board system or two-tier system of Germany,
113
and the single board or one-tier system of the United States.

emerging international standards.”). According to Pistor, the degree of imposition of a transplanted legal rule correlates to the likelihood of failure of the
rule. PISTOR, supra note 3, at 2. Current corporate governance endeavors
eerily hark back to similar efforts at imposition of foreign transplants in the
post WW II era in Japan. See Kim, supra, at 277 n.13 (quoting Thomas I.
Blakemore & Makoto Yazawa, Japanese Commercial Code Revisions: Concerning Corporations, 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 12, 15–16 (1953)).
111. “Although Korea hails from the German civil law tradition, it is not a
legal requirement that employees can elect a board member of the company.”
Hasung Jang & Joongi Kim, Korea Country Paper: The Role of Boards and
Stakeholders in Corporate Governance, THE THIRD OECD ASIAN ROUNDTABLE
ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Singapore, Apr. 4–6, 2001. Like Japan, Korea
demonstrates significant U.S. influences in its statutory law, and some of its
financial institutions.
112. Chul-Song Lee, So-soo-joo-joo-gwon-ui shil-hyo-sung gum-to [Review of
the Effectiveness of Minority Shareholder Rights], 35 SANG-JANG-HYUP 7, 7
(1997), cited in Kim, supra note 110, at 282 n.34.
113. Kim, supra note 110, at 277–78.
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The legacy of ill-conceived, poorly indigenized, legal transplants persisted over decades, the structure finally cracking
under the pressures of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, according
to Joongi Kim. It is thus terribly ironic that solutions proposed
in the wake of the crisis, such as cumulative voting, are similarly ill-conceived transplants.
Cumulative voting is a curious rule. It smacks of private legal rules, election procedures at, say, the bridge club or the
country club. In the United States, its “application to shareholder voting is a path-dependent historical oddity.”114 It is a
procedural voting mechanism, and a cumbersome one at that,115
under which minority shareholders have a chance (but only a
chance) for some degree of representation on the board of directors.116 There is no statutory right to direct representation on
the board. Although cumulative voting might be moderately
useful in achieving its purposes in a corporation with a small
number of shareholders, or one with another form of concentrated ownership, in such cases there are usually better mechanisms available.117
Cumulative voting was designed as a compensatory mechanism to override the principle of majority rule, whereby a ma114. The accepted story of the introduction of cumulative voting in the
United States is truly a bit bizarre:
As part of the Illinois constitutional revision of 1870, adherents of
proportional representation won a major battle to require cumulative
voting for the Illinois House of Representatives. The principle having
prevailed, the constitutional convention also required cumulative voting in the election of directors for private corporations. The objective
was to protect minority interests against overreaching by a majority,
particularly in circumstances in which representation on the board
would give the minority the information necessary to police against
fraud.
Jeffrey Gordon, Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 124, 142 (1994).
115. “One undesirable aspect of cumulative voting is that it tends to be a
little tricky. If a shareholder casts votes in an irrational or inefficient way, he
may not get the directorships his position entitles him to; when voting cumulatively it is relatively easy to make a mistake in spreading votes around.”
ROBERT W. HAMILTON & JONATHAN R. MACEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS 534 (8th ed. 2003).
116. For a historical analysis of cumulative voting, see Gordon, supra note
114.
117. Shareholder agreements and the use of voting groups, for example.
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jority shareholder, through voting procedures, could elect an
entire slate to the board of a U.S. corporation.118 In the United
States, the original statutory formulation became a mandatory
feature in many state laws.119 Over time, however, partly in response to the shift to more manager-friendly corporate laws in
the United States, cumulative voting started to slip back into
the realm of private legal rules; it remained a feature of corporate statutes, but was made optional in most states.120 Thus,
cumulative voting was made permissive, not mandatory, in
most states and ultimately left to determination in the corporate charter.121 German corporate law, on the other hand, has
long provided a statutory mechanism to ensure direct supervisory board representation by certain constituencies—a statutory right to direct representation.122
In the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Korea
acted quickly to re-establish confidence in its markets.123
118. For a description of the operation of cumulative voting, see HAMILTON
& MACEY, supra note 115, at 534.
119. See Gordon, supra note 114.
120. Id. at 155–60. See also HAMILTON & MACEY, supra note 115, at 541
(“Under the MBCA [Model Business Corporations Act], cumulative
voting, like preemptive rights, is an ‘opt in’ election to be chosen by
an appropriate provision in the articles of incorporation. As of 1998,
thirty states had adopted an ‘opt in’ provision while twelve states had
an ‘opt out’ election. Eight states make cumulative voting mandatory
for all corporations, five by provision in state constitutions. The
number of states with mandatory cumulative voting, however, is declining. In 1990 California, long the bastion of mandatory cumulative
voting, made that manner of voting permissive for corporations with
shares listed on a public exchange or with more than 800 shareholders of record.”).
121. Gordon posits two propositions for the demise of cumulative voting in
the United States: “The evidence suggests two very different hypotheses: one
holds that cumulative voting fell victim to a managerial race to the bottom;
the other posits that cumulative voting, even if once useful, came to interfere
with good governance.” Gordon, supra note 114, at 141–42 (emphasis added).
122. See SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 36, at 892 (“In Germany, under the
system of Mitbestimmung (co-determination), workers elect normally one
third of the supervisory board.”).
123. As Kim points out,
The 1997 financial crisis exposed a wide range of structural weaknesses in Korea’s economy. International organizations such as the
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (“World Bank”), in particular, criti-
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Among other things, waves of corporate law reforms were enacted, some at the suggestion of international financial institutions such as The World Bank and the IMF, with cumulative
voting provisions among them. The cumulative voting rules
adopted, though, were of the “weak,” or quasi-public, variety.
They were not mandatory in that they could be bypassed
through amendments to the corporate charter. Although some
Korean academics had queried, prior to enactment, the effectiveness of these “optional” or “default” rules,124 they had been
advised that this was a modern formulation of the rule as found
in the United States.
As a result, Korean corporations moved quickly, and predictably, to neutralize cumulative voting rules by charter
amendments, rendering the statutory rules ineffective.125 But
then, cumulative voting was inherently ineffective in any case,
as it so proved in Korea. “Even among those companies that
have not excluded [cumulative voting] and…therefore must follow it, to date there have been no reports that a company has
elected a director through cumulative voting.”126
cized Korea’s corporate sector and blamed ineffective corporate regulation as a major cause of the crisis….In return for receiving their financial assistance, Korea enacted another round of extensive
amendments to its corporate laws on December 28, 1998….Finally, on
December 31, 1999, several additional amendments were enacted.
Kim, supra note 110, at 276.
124. Conversation with Hasung Jang, Director, Asian Institute of Corporate
Governance, Korea University Business School, in Washington, D.C. (Sept.
2000).
125. See Jang & Kim, supra note 111.
126. Id. at 3
(“As of 1998, cumulative voting has become an option for companies.
Unfortunately, from a policy standpoint, it has remained largely ineffective. The problem lies in that when the Commercial Code was
amended to allow cumulative voting the new law also included a provision that permits companies to exclude it through their articles of
incorporation. (CC382-2). As a result, as of November 2000, 77.6% of
all listed companies have adopted provisions in their articles that
specifically exclude cumulative voting.…The new SEC has attempted
to ameliorate this situation by requiring that shareholders with at
least one percent of the voting stock can request cumulative voting.
(SEC 191-18). This substantially lowers the previous holding requirement of three percent that still applies to non-listed companies.
The new SEC also tries to reverse the trend of excluding cumulative
voting and has stopped just short of mandating it.”).
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Wrong rule, wrong form of rule. A German-style rule providing for direct board representation, a substantive right rather
than a dubious procedural mechanism, would likely have been
more compatible with the underlying German framework of the
corporate law (even as it had become denatured by earlier U.S.
transplants)127 and, thus, more effective. Some commentators
had actually suggested a more German style rule, but did not
prevail.128 And, if an effective cumulative voting rule had still
been the desired result, a mandatory statutory provision would
have been more effective.129
However, the overriding question of whether cumulative voting actually promotes better corporate governance, even in the
United States, has never been satisfactorily answered.130 Cumulative voting does appear, in its “weak” or “optional” form, in
most state statutes in the United States. Its operation is discussed, sometimes at length, in U.S. law texts.131 In other
words, the cumulative voting mechanism is a visible tip of the
iceberg. However, cumulative voting rights are not very effective as a minority shareholder protection mechanism under any
circumstances, and particularly not in a listed or publicly-

127. With respect to the adoption of the U.S.-style board of directors in
Japanese law, it was said at the time, “On a Commercial Code of continental
origin, there have been forcibly grafted certain limbs of alien, Anglo-American
origin.” Kim, supra note 111, at 277 n.13 (quoting Thomas I. Blakemore &
Makoto Yazawa, Japanese Commercial Code Revisions: Concerning Corporations, 2 AM. J. COMP. L 12, 15–16 (1953)).
128. According to Kim,
One observer argues that Korea is not ready for the cumulative voting system because it will create confusion...Choi proposes instead a
new system of corporate governance whereby 50% of the board would
be elected as before, 35% would be elected with each shareholder’s
voting rights being limited to a maximum of 3%, and the remaining
25% would be elected by large creditors….For companies with more
than 10,000 workers, a representative from the workers would be
elected.
Kim, supra note 110, at 295 n.107.
129. Jang & Kim, supra note 111.
130. Gordon, supra note 114, at 127 (“[T]he evidence is far from clear that
cumulative voting increases aggregate shareholder welfare across all firms at
all times.”).
131. See HAMILTON & MACEY, supra note 124.
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traded U.S. corporation.132 Since the greater corporate governance debate implicates only publicly traded corporations, cumulative voting rights are thus more or less irrelevant.133 Cumulative voting provisions are fossils trapped in the bedrock of U.S.
corporate statutes.
This raises the question of how cumulative voting provisions
gained international prominence as a corporate governance
mechanism. The highly regarded and influential LLSV studies
are a likely culprit.134 In the difficult search to isolate econometric indicia of shareholder protections, the statutory provisions
in U.S. corporate law on cumulative voting were visible and accessible. That cumulative voting rights, as a minority shareholder protection, were irrelevant to publicly-traded corporations in the United States was not immediately obvious.135 The
132. Irrespective of whether cumulative voting mechanisms are available,
minority shareholder voting rights in U.S. publicly-traded corporations are
largely illusory. Unlike many other places in the world (including the UK and
continental Europe), the residual authority in a corporation does not reside in
the general meeting of shareholders. In particular, the control of the nomination process by the directors themselves, together with management control of
the proxy voting process in the United States, means that minority shareholder voting rights count for very little. Shareholders may only vote for (or
abstain from voting for) the slate of directors put before them by management:
[T]here is one big problem with demanding more activism from
shareholders; their votes in America are still largely worthless, as
this season’s proxy season, which has just begun, will show once
again. Despite all the talk in America about shareholder democracy
and ownership, shareholder resolutions, even if backed by a majority,
are rarely binding on management. In many cases, managers can
even stop a resolution from being put to a vote. The Securities and
Exchange Commission recently proposed a tiny rule change to make
it slightly easier for shareholders to nominate candidates for election
to boards of directors. Lobbyists representing America’s top bosses
easily and unceremoniously killed the proposal.
Bossing the Bosses, ECONOMIST, Apr. 9, 2005, at 13.
133. Mark Roe notes, “Wall Street lawyers might have reservations about
heavily using preemptive rights, cumulative voting and the minimum percentage needed to call a special shareholders meeting—items not likely to be
near the top of most American lawyers’ lists of Delaware corporate law’s most
important legal protections.” MARK J. ROE, CORPORATE LAW’S LIMITS 29 n.37
(Colum. Law School, Ctr. for Law and Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 186,
Jan. 16, 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=260582 (last visited May 20, 2005).
134. See supra note 2.
135. Except to Wall Street lawyers, perhaps.
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complexity and dynamism of legal systems present difficult
challenges for econometric analysis.
However, it gets worse: the “defect” in the cumulative voting
provision in Korea was “fixed.”136 A form of mandatory cumulative voting has proven to be worse than merely irrelevant for
Korean corporations with voting shares trading in the United
States. It is virtually impossible to reconcile mandatory cumulative voting provisions with the already difficult U.S. proxy
voting rules and practices for publicly-traded corporations.137
Further, like most other non-U.S. issuers,138 shares of Korean
corporations will usually be traded through a derivative form of
security, known as American Depository Receipts, thus adding
further devilish complexity to the voting process.139
H. Class Actions
Class actions present even less likelihood of effectiveness as a
governance mechanism in most transitional and emerging markets. At least with cumulative voting, there would be a chance
of developing rules that could, technically, work in the context
of corporate legislation to which they were not native. Class
actions, however, depend upon the existence of an experienced
judiciary, an extensive network of other procedural rules, an
active body of litigation professionals and, in terms of particular
legal sensibilities, a general populace with a litigious bent.140
136. See JANG & KIM, supra note 111.
137. As noted supra Section VI(g), the vast majority of U.S. publicly-traded
corporations do not have cumulative voting provisions, so the proxy voting
rules are not designed to take them into account.
138. Canadian and Israeli issuers being notable exceptions.
139. For example, refer to the 2005 U.S. proxy materials for KT (formerly
known as Korea Telecom Corp.) which has American Depositary Receipts
(ADRs) trading in the United States. (Proxy materials on file with author).
The complexity of the voting procedures, resulting from the use of cumulative
voting, would astonish a U.S. issuer of publicly traded securities. In the case
of KT, it is interesting to note that cumulative voting was at the behest of its
labor union. “Under the Korean Commercial Code and Securities Exchange
Act, anyone who holds more than 1% of shares of KT with voting rights can
request cumulative voting. In this case, Mr. Ji Jae Shik, a shareholder, requested cumulative voting on February 23, 2005. Please note that this request process was actually initiated by KT Labor Union.”
140. See generally HON. JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS
TORT LITIGATIONS: THE EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER
MULTI-PARTY DEVICES (1995).

File: Jordan.MACRO.06.16.05.doc

2005]

Created on: 6/16/2005 3:26 PM

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

Last Printed: 6/17/2005 1:35 PM

1025

Class actions form part of the body of procedural law, in the
great common law tradition of no right (or wrong) without a
remedy.
So-called “class action” provisions dropped into otherwise
substantive corporate law of a transitional or emerging market
economy would arrive dead on arrival. There would be no procedural rules or institutions to support them, much less the inclination to make use of them, were such rules to develop.141
VII. TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS
Following a dozen or so years of “a massive process of change
in adherence to legal information,” as H. Patrick Glenn puts it,
a huge, slow, process of digestion and “indigenization” is now
ongoing.142 Like a boa constrictor enjoying a good meal, there is
no doubt that in certain places, at certain times, some bits may
be spat out or pass through without leaving a trace. There is
equally little doubt that what is ingested will be transformed by
the process.
In terms of mobilizing the forces of the capital markets effectively to raise standards of governance in corporations, the
Latin American experience may be particularly instructive.143
The initiatives differ among themselves, depending on various
factors such as prevailing forms of corporate ownership and
capital structure. Not every initiative may be directly transferable elsewhere in all cases, but there may be positive lessons to
be learned.

141. Between 1998 and 2002, there were only thirteen suits filed by minority shareholders in Korea. See supra note 44.
One recent reform intended to impose discipline on managers and
majority shareholders is the availability of class action suits. The new
law passed by the National Assembly, the Securities Related Class
Action Law, will allow shareholders to file class actions from January
1, 2005, in respect of companies with Won 2 trillion or more in assets….
Kyung Taek Jung & Hwa Soo Chung, Korea Aims for World Class Corporate
Governance, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Apr. 2005, available at http://www.legalmedia
group.com/iflr/default.asp?Page=1&SID=5710&F=F.
142. See generally Legrand, supra note 20.
143. For more detailed analysis of Latin American initiatives in corporate
governance, see Jordan & Lubrano, supra note 48.
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Latin Americans are proving adept at legal transplantation
because they have the advantage of proximity and exposure to
North American law, markets and practices. For example, both
Mexico and Quebec, French civil code jurisdictions, can fearlessly introduce Anglo-American trust law concepts, and make
them work, because they understand the principles and have a
long history of familiarity with them. Further, the integration
of the North and South American capital markets means that
Latin Americans want to make the new concepts work, a good
predictor of effectiveness according to Pistor.144 In addition,
capital market integration along this north/south axis is well
advanced and the international signaling imperative is at
work.145 Further, Latin Americans are introducing governance
mechanisms in multiple guises along the continuum of private
and public legal rules in order to amplify the prospects of effectiveness.
Brazil’s initiatives are particularly interesting in moving contractual governance mechanisms (private legal rules) into the
listing rules (semi-public legal rules) and then backing them
with corresponding legislative changes (ex ante public legal
rules). The BOVESPA’s Novo Mercado has elicited attention
elsewhere.146 It may prove to be good vehicle for maximizing the
effectiveness of capital markets forces on the governance of corporations. Time will tell.
Of course, these observations have been based on recent, but
past, experiences. There are now several new factors to consider. The corporate governance scandals in the United States
have shaken confidence in the old, familiar mechanisms of capital market and corporate governance.147 The formal, public response to the scandals, embodied in the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation,148 is more a symptom than a solution. New approaches are
144. See PISTOR, supra note 3.
145. See COFFEE, COMPETITION AMONG SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note 4.
146. The Jakarta Stock Exchange, for example, and its capital markets
regulator, BAPEPAM, for example, were interested in the Brazilian experience.
147. The Enron and WorldCom scandals being the most prominent, and the
proximate cause of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 558 (2003).
148. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002)
[hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley Act].
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appearing elsewhere, notably in Europe.149 Europe is also providing new models of capital market regulation, controversial
and untested though they may be, in the form of the EU Prospectus Directive, for example, which comes into effect in July
2005. Revitalized European stock markets, together with a new
pan-European regulatory structure, may be more compatible
with and change the dynamics of the legal systems of any number of countries. And finally, could it be that an older style of
commercial morality and heightened legal sensibilities are
creeping back into U.S. boardrooms?150

149.
If William Donaldson is looking for ways to shake up the U.S. stock
markets, as the Securities and Exchange Commission chairman appears poised to consider, he might want to look at Europe. European’s [sic] stock markets have their own flaws, but in the past decade have taken just the kind of steps to electronic and cheap exchanges overseen by independent regulators that could now be in
play in the U.S. The pressure for change in the U.S. markets comes
in the wake of an outcry over the perceived lack of corporate governance at the New York Stock Exchange and the forced resignation of
its chief executive, Dick Grasso.
Model Market Could be in Europe, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2003, at C14.
150. Sarbanes-Oxley Act does require disclosure of whether reporting corporations have an ethics committee. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 406. See also
Boeing Chief Quits Over Affair, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2005, at 1
(“Harry Stonecipher, the man brought out of retirement to restore
Boeing’s reputation, was ousted as chief executive yesterday for having an affair with a female executive. The departure is a serious blow
to Boeing, which is working hard to restore its reputation. A series of
executives has left under a cloud….The episode also raises questions
about how far corporate ethics should reach into personal lives.”).

